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1. Introduction
Zheng He’s travels (1371-1433) have become a 
central point in Sino-African relations’ discourse. 
Historiographic attention to Zheng He and its 
meaning for Sino-African relations has shifted from 
very scarce coverage throughout history to an ever 
greater interest in recent years. The first official records that we know of nowadays have covered the 
voyages in a superficial way, putting little importance to said endeavor. In recent decades however, 
we can perceive an increased interest towards historically analyzing the voyages, and towards 
rhetorically using them in official foreign relations’ discourse. While some scholars consider Zheng 
He’s travels to be pacific explorations, others claim that if analyzed from a different perspective, 
they can be seen as a kind of disguised colonialism. However, even if historical evidences are 
scarce, primary sources lead us to assume that the expeditions were neither completely pacific nor 
aggressive. As we will show further below, they can be understood as a quest for overseas recognition 
which intended to include foreign countries into the Ming tributary system by what modern-day 
international relations scholars would denominate a credible way of appeal: namely an awe-inspiring 
military equipment. Even if Zheng He’s travels should not be interpreted as “peaceful exploration” 
or “friendship travels”, Chinese politicians are nevertheless spreading this image via China’s foreign 
relation discourse. Therefore, it is our aim to argue that, in the case of Sino-African relations, Zheng 
He’s historical precedent is wrongly represented in order to justify China’s involvement in Africa by 
creating a benevolent image of herself, legitimizing its presence and reassuring African audiences. 
This analogical use of Zheng He’s travels to Africa is thus exaggerating and even distorting historical 
facts for the purpose of satisfying present political needs.
In order to argue the said, this article is going to be structured in two main parts: a historical 
reevaluation of Zheng He’s travels to Africa, and a critical assessment of the discursive use of this 
historical precedent in contemporary Sino-African relations discourse. Firstly, we are going to give 
a short historical contextualization on Zheng He and its voyages to Africa in order to clarify the 
necessary background information upon which the expeditions can be analyzed. Consequently, we 
will focus on the academic debate concerning the whether-or-not peaceful character of Zheng He’s 
voyages. In this first part, it is our aim to clarify that Zheng He’s travels should not be understood 
as peaceful exploration, but as a confident endeavor of Ming dynasty power projection. Secondly, 
we will pay attention to the way in which historical events can be instrumentally used to fulfill 
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contemporary political needs. Based on this theoretical discussion, and by making use of recent 
examples mentioning Zheng He in Sino-African relations’ discourse, we are going to show that 
Zheng He’s travels have been instrumentalized and dehistoricized for the purpose of projecting a 
benevolent image of China.
2. Zheng He’s travels to Africa
2.1. Historical context and Zheng He’s travels to Africa
Zheng He grew up in a well-off Muslim family who had traditional ties with the Mongol rulers of 
Yunnan during the Yuan dynasty (1279-1368). After the collapse of said dynasty and throughout the 
following invasion of Ming troops to Yunnan province, Zheng He was captured as a war criminal and 
taken to Nanjing. Consequently, he was castrated and taken to the then Prince of Yan, Zhu Di (1360-
1424), as a eunuch servant. Zhu Di was going to be the future emperor Yongle (r. 1402-1424) of the 
Ming dynasty (1368-1644), and it was during this period of time that Zheng He already established 
good relations with him. It was these twenty or so years of close relationship with the future 
emperor that made possible his posterior designation as leader of the “treasure fleet” expeditions1. 
The expeditions of the “treasure fleet” –as they are known due to carrying highly precious products 
such as silk, porcelain etc.– are commonly agreed upon to be a total of seven. The biggest voyages 
included up to 300 vessels and 27,000 men. Wang explains that “the first three expeditions went as 
far as the west coast of India; the fourth went farther, crossing to the Persian Gulf; the fifth and the 
seventh expeditions visited the east coast of Africa”2. Thus, we are dealing with the biggest maritime 
expeditions that we have historical evidence of to this point3. In addition to being manned up to 
a considerable extend, the vessels were similarly characterized by being heavily armed, carrying 
entire troops that could be employed if necessary4. In order to place Zheng He’s expeditions in the 
right context, it is necessary to mention that they were not the only ones to be hold during Yongle’s 
reign. According to the Cambridge History of China, there have been a total of 62 maritime missions 
to a range of Southeast Asian countries and 95 envoy missions in return5.  Zheng He’s vessels visited 
Africa on the fourth (1412/14-1415), the fifth (1417-1419), the sixth (1421-1422) and probably the 
seventh mission (1431-1433)6. While on the fourth expedition they probably just visited Hormuz, 
the other missions payed visits to up to twenty countries on the Eastern coast of Africa7. While 
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when the earlier got enthroned, Zheng He directly became Grand Director of the Directorate of Palace Servants (Dreyer, 
2007, 22).
2 (Wang, 1998, 320); the general pattern of all the travels was something like this: China - Champa - Strait of Malacca - 
northern Sumatra - Ceylon - Calicut, while those expeditions who went to Africa further passed through Hormuz - Aden 
- East coast of Africa (Dreyer, 2007, 35).
3 Phillip Snow says in his book about Sino-African relations that Zheng He’s fleet made those of Columbus and Vasco da 
Gama “look like amateurs” (Snow, 1988, 21).
4 (Dreyer, 2007, 27)
5 (Mote and Twitchett, 1988, 270)
6 Ibid. 75-95.
7 (Li, 2015, 54)
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there is considerable debate over the exact countries the fleets might have visited in Africa, most 
agree on the principal countries being Mogadishu, Brava, Jubu and Malindi8. The initial visits started 
a kind of intercourse between Chinese and African envoys respectively sending gifts and tributes 
throughout the time-frame of Zheng He’s expeditions9. In response to this interchange, all of these 
travels have been partly organized to escort previously dispatched envoys to their home countries10. 
Since it is commonly agreed on that these expeditions may have been the first large-scale direct 
contact between Africans and Chinese, they have been considered “the most important period for 
Sino-African relations in history”11.
The initial motivation for Zheng He’s fleet to sail further into previously undiscovered lands may be 
explained by the incentive received from exotic animals such as the giraffe12. This idea is underpinned 
by a statement in the Taizong shilu which manifests that the giraffe was the only reason for sending 
Zheng He’s fleet so far south13. According to Duyvendak, Zheng He and his companions had their 
first encounter with a giraffe in Bengal in 1414, which on itself was a gift by the African country of 
Malindi to the Bengal king. He says that the Somali pronunciation of “girin” might have made the 
Chinese relate this animal with the mythical qilin, which on itself is a “symbol for heaven’s favor and 
proof of the virtue of the Emperor”14. In response to this encounter, Zheng He may have decided 
to travel to Malindi for the purpose of returning one of these mythical animals to the Ming court. 
The immediate interest in that animal by the Chinese can be reflected in a Mingshi entry on Malindi 
which, in contrast to the other African countries, does not mention any sociopolitical aspects of 
the locality but dedicates itself completely to the description of the giraffe/qilin15. Duyvendak 
interpreted this encounter in a quite romantic fashion, saying that
Thus it happened that the giraffe from the African wilderness, as it strode into the Emperor’s Court, 
became the emblem of Perfect Virtue, Perfect Government, and Perfect Harmony in the Empire and 
in the Universe. Rarely have such extravagant cosmic claims been made in such refined language for 
any living animal. Surely it is the most sophisticated instance of theolatry in history, the apogee of 
the lore of the unicorn! This is what the discovery of Africa did for Chinese Confucian ideology.16 
Apart from this enlightening and self-legitimizing encounter, Zheng He’s travels to Africa were 
particular because they seem to have been realized without any considerable conflicts with local 
countries. Accounts like a novel by Luo Maodeng tell us about armed conflict in the encounters of 
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9 (Snow, 1988, 25)
10 (Dreyer, 2007, 91)
11 (Gao, 1984, 245)
12 The idea of the giraffe motivating Zheng He to sail further westwards to the coastal countries of Africa is accepted by 
(Duyvendak, 1949, 32); (Snow, 1988, 24); (Dreyer, 2007, 90).
13 Taizong shilu cited in (Dreyer, 2007, 90).
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15 Mention to Mingshi in (Dreyer, 2007, 90).
16 (Duyvendak, 1949, 35)
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Zheng He’s fleet with African countries, but these literary sources cannot be sustained by historical 
evidences17. Snow, for instance, emphasized the fact that “[...] the Chinese were tactful, anxious to 
avoid disturbing the small coastal states any more than was necessary to achieve their basic ends”18. 
It is important to mention this with regard to the military capability of the fleets. Based on these 
assumptions, we can thus insinuate that even if the Chinese had the military capacity, they were 
not making use of them in Africa in order to impose anything as would thereafter be the European 
fashion. As we will see further below, this conflict-avoiding approach can best be explained when 
understanding Zheng He’s travels proper reasons and goals.
Another crucial fact in this important historical moment of Sino-African relations is that the Chinese 
visitors didn’t come to stay or create long-term settlements. As we will argue later on, this is 
principally due to the fact that the Chinese were not searching for trade enclaves or commercial 
dominance. However, it is still remarkable that there is very little evidence for any type of Chinese 
settling due to other reasons. Recently, there has been a lot of media coverage about a village in 
eastern Kenya, whose inhabitants claim to be descendants of Zheng He’s crew. However, if the 
story is true, then those Chinese who settled there would not be considered intentional settlers as 
they arrived by accident19. In this regard, Zheng He’s fleets didn’t have any important social impact 
apart from inspiring trade reflected in the creation of a greater demand for overseas products, and 
establishing short-term intercourse between peoples of both entities. Snow accordingly resumes 
this stupefaction saying that “none, in the end, is as startling as the simple fact that for once in 
African history an armada of foreigners came, did their business and went away again”20.
2.2. Zheng He - Proto-colonialism or friendship expeditions?
When asking us about the nature of Zheng He’s expeditions, it is necessary to recognize the 
limited amount of primary sources that we can draw on. For instance, the Mingshi, the official 
historiographic register of the Ming dynasty, just mentions Zheng He’s travels with 700 characters21. 
For the displeasure of subsequent historians, “Chinese writers of later times never considered them 
glorious achievements and never took any serious interest in them”22. The reasons for this lack 
of historiographic covering is most probably due to ideological and power struggles between the 
Confucian civil servants and eunuchs23. As in contrast to the eunuchs who understood Zheng He’s 
travels as a means to advance their group interests, Confucianists generally despised this activity for 
being “wasteful and frivolous”24. It is due to these reasons that most of the interpretations about 
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the travels’ intentions make their arguments on the grounds of some of the eunuchs’ travelogues25. 
It seems plausible that due to this lack of historical evidence, interpretations can be strongly biased 
to fulfill the narrator’s intentions. Since Zheng He’s travels were imperial endeavors, it is necessary 
to ask us about the Ming court’s foreign policy ambitions in order to resolve the dilemma about 
is intentions. At the beginning of the dynasty, Ming foreign policy was not expansionist in nature. 
After several defeats in the northern plains and failing to reconquer Outer Mongolia in 1372, the 
first Ming emperor Hongwu (r. 1368-1398) turned out to be rather defensive26. With regard to 
maritime expeditions, said emperor stated that “foreign countries beyond the seas that are not 
harming China should not be attacked without cause”27. Hongwu established a list to be taken into 
account by following emperors, which contained fifteen countries that should not be invaded nor 
occupied28. From this perspective, it seems reasonable to contextualize Zheng He’s voyages into a 
relatively peaceful environment of Ming foreign relations. 
On the other hand, emperor Yongle’s approach towards foreign lands is characterized by a far more 
expansionist undertone. The latter is probably most known to subsequent generations for the 
invasion of Vietnam, five expeditions to Mongolia, the capital movement to Beijing and Zheng He’s 
voyages29. Yongle’s relationship with foreign countries breaks, at least in part, with his predecessor’s 
approach as he decides to annex Annam, which was part of Hongwu’s list not to invade. According 
to Wang, these expansionist moves can be explained by Yongle’s “usurpation and his desire for 
universal legitimacy”30. However, it is important to mention that Yongle’s expansionist ambitions 
were not positively regarded by the Confucian civil servants surrounding him31.
Needham, in his great work on the development of Chinese science and technology, argues that 
Zheng He’s expeditions lack any type of territorial supremacy or colonizing intentions. Said scholar 
promotes the vision that all of the Chinese operations were made to pay friendship visits to foreign 
harbors, and that the Chinese ships cannot be called “armadas” but rather mercantile vessels of a 
national commercial authority32. He claims that during these expeditions, just three armed attacks 
of self-defense had been produced33. While highlighting this pacifist character, Needham compares 
these travels with the Portuguese endeavor nearly 50 years later. In this regard, said scholar claims 
that “[...], the Chinese, [were] calm and pacifist, without the disturbance of a legacy of enmity, 
generous to a certain extent, without threatening the life of anyone, tolerant with their condescension 
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25 The most common travelogues are “The Overall Survey of the Ocean’s Shores” (Yingyai shenglan) by Ma Huan; “The 
Overall Survey of the Starry Raft” (Xingcha shenglan) by Fei Xin; and “Description of the Barbarian Countries of the 
West” (Xiyang fanguo zhi) by Gong Zhen.
26 (Dreyer, 2007, 16)
27 Citation in (Dreyer, 2007, 16).
28 Ibid.
29 Ibid. 6
30 (Wang, 1998, 320)
31 (Dreyer, 2007, 24)
32 (Needham, 1978, 70)
33 Ibid. One in Palembang 1406, in Ceylon 1410 and in Sumatra in 1414/15.
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of weapons, but without colonizing or establishing strongholds”34. According to Needham, Zheng 
He’s expeditions were not only pacifist; they were furthermore characterized by a high degree of 
respect towards other cultures and religions. He makes this statement by referring to a three-lingual 
(Chinese, Tamil and Persian) inscription on a stone stele found on the island of Ceylon in 1911. 
The inscriptions mention gifts offered by Zheng He to all the three religious authorities present on 
the island: Muslim, Hindu and Buddhist. In Needham’s eyes, this is an argument to prove that the 
Chinese didn’t think of themselves as having any religious authority. He argues that, in contrast to 
the Portuguese, this underlying conception allowed the Chinese to deal with the locals in a way of 
mutual respect35. Needham’s approach, in analyzing Zheng He’s expeditions, needs to be criticized 
from several perspectives. First of all, it is highly probable that if the Chinese didn’t preach any type 
of religious superiority, this may not be due to a sense of mutual respect. It is rather plausible that 
this way of behavior was rooted in pragmatism mixed with sinocentrism. With regard to Zheng He’s 
encounter with Africans in Mogadishu, Snow argues that “extensive contact with barbarians was 
neither desirable nor necessary”, so if there was no disruption of their life, this may be explained by 
an underlying sentiment of superiority36. If Western colonialists understood cultural superiority as a 
pretext for forcing their views on others, Chinese didn’t even feel the need to intermingle in the first 
place. This doesn’t mean that China did as worse as Western countries in their approach to Africa, 
however recognizing this background helps us reconsider and deconstruct the romantic narrative of 
mutual support. Secondly, Needham doesn’t include the sociopolitical context of emperor Yongle’s 
ambitions in his recount of Zheng He. It is necessary to analyze the voyages in the political context 
of the latter, since it was Yongle himself who promoted them37. The intrinsic relationship between 
Yongle’s personal ambitions and Zheng He’s expeditions can be seen by the fact that they started 
with his accession to the throne and –with the exception of one last voyage under emperor Xuande 
(r. 1425-1435)– finished with his death. Hence, the fact of not mentioning Yongle’s ambitions 
when recounting Zheng He’s voyages is like “relating the voyages of the Spanish Armada without 
mentioning that the political intentions of Philip II had a lot to do with that”38.
In contrast to Needham, other scholars such as Wade and Finlay present a less pacifist interpretation 
of Zheng He’s expeditions. The earlier does this by contextualizing the travels with emperor Yongle’s 
other expansionist policies in Yunnan and Dai Viet. Furthermore, he makes his argument through 
an analysis of armed conflicts during Zheng He’s travels themselves. While using the word gunboat 
to refer to Zheng He’s vessels, Wade insists on the importance of including the military aspect in 
the overall account in order to demystify “the stress placed on these missions in much current 
scholarship, both Chinese and non-Chinese, as ‘voyages of friendship’”39. His point of view is thus 
coherent with Finlays, inasmuch as the latter argues that the voyages were not tranquil due to the 
Chinese’s pacifist character, but due to the fact that the “troops in the fleet were experienced, heavily 
armed, and greater in number than the entire population of most entrepôts between Nanjing and 
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Mombasa”40. What is striking with regard to Wade’s argument, is the fact that he even goes one 
step further, claiming that the expeditions can be understood as some kind of proto-colonialism: 
They were engaged in that early form of maritime colonialism by which a dominant maritime power 
took control (either through force or the threat thereof) of the main port-polities along the major 
East-West maritime trade network, as well as the seas between, thereby gaining economic and 
political benefits.41
According to said scholar, the only reason for Zheng He’s expeditions not to develop into a kind of 
colonialism with European features was their abrupt ending after Yongle’s death. Even if Wade’s 
argument is broadly coherent when looking at is from a Western colonial experience, there are 
actually little evidences that support his view in the Chinese context. It is true that trade was one 
of the motivating factors for Zheng He’s expeditions, but little evidence points to the idea of trying 
to establish a kind of monopoly of trade as suggested by the latter42. For instance, great effort 
had been put into foreign trade through governmental control43, but private maritime trade, which 
had flourished during the Song dynasty, was gradually being restricted by the Ming44. Zheng He’s 
mission was not meant to guarantee commercial access and forcing trade on countries throughout 
Southeast Asia and the Indian Ocean, trade was merely a second-level intention. As Duyvendak 
accurately put it in his early speech on Sino-African relations, Zheng He principally went “shopping 
for the ladies of the Imperial Harem”45. In fact, Zheng He’s voyages should neither be understood 
as peaceful voyages, nor as proto-colonialism, it is much more accurate to identify them as a Ming 
power projection by means of extending the tributary system46. According to Dreyer, the Mingshi is 
unexpectedly precise when talking about the expeditions intentions. In the biography on Zheng He, 
said historiographic collection says that Yongle “wanted to display his soldiers in strange lands in 
order to make manifest the wealth and power of the Middle Kingdom”. It goes on saying that Zheng 
He’s fleets “went in succession to the various foreign countries, proclaiming the edicts of the Son 
of Heaven and giving gifts to their rulers and chieftains. Those who did not submit were pacified by 
force”47. This primary source reveals quite accurately the main intentions of the expeditions. While 
they were not meant to impose any kind of colonial rule or religious doctrine, these travels were 
principally engaged to include overseas countries into the traditional Chinese tributary system48. 
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41 (Wade, 2005, 51)
42 (Dreyer, 2007, 3)
43 (Duyvendak, 1949, 26)
44 (Dreyer, 2007, 3); even though officially restricted, it has been argued that this “the ban during the Yongle reign was 
flexible”, see (Meicun and Zhang, 2015, 418).
45 (Duyvendak, 1949, 27)
46 (Dreyer, 2007, 26)
47 Ibid. 33
48 Ibid. 3; according to Dreyer, including foreign countries into the tributary system meant that countries should 
officially recognize Chinese power by presenting tributes to the emperor and use the Chinese calendar at least when 
communicating with China. In return, the Chinese would bring gifts such as silk, porcelain etc. Ibid. 34.
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Hence, Zheng He’s travels can be understood as demanding the “symbolic acquiescence in the 
Chinese view of the world”, principally a matter of prestige for the ruling court49. The fact that 
the Mingshi includes “force” as an instrument to make other countries submit to this worldview, 
explains why the ships where so well-armed. Furthermore, it deconstructs the myth of the travels 
being a wholly peaceful exploration on the basis of mutual equality.
3. Zheng He in Sino-African relations discourse
3.1. The use of historical precedents in foreign policy discourse
Having clarified that Zheng He’s travels shouldn’t be reduced to being a phenomenon of peaceful 
exploration, we now want to dedicate our attention to how sociopolitical representations of 
historical events can be ascribed with new significations according to contemporary needs. History 
as a discursive tool can help creating a sense of collective identity as well as legitimizing certain 
contemporary phenomena by rooting them into the past. However, if we accept the fact that history 
is primordially playing a role of satisfying present needs in contemporary representations, then we 
have to admit its biased nature, accept the fact that history may be distorted in a way to better suit 
our contemporary purposes. The rhetorical use of analogical reasoning is a good example of said 
concern, shifting history towards becoming a simple justificatory instrument. As we will see below, 
this mode of social representation is suited when targeting foreign audiences in a country’s foreign 
policy discourse, especially when it comes to rectifying novel foreign policy phenomena.
Making use of history in contemporary sociopolitical representations has a range of benefits. In its 
most fundamental role, history or collective memory is useful for the social construction of identity 
among those who participate in a certain discourse. This is due to the fact that history itself gives 
people a feeling of belonging. Being able to identify with past events, communities or localities gives 
peoples’ existence a meaning, purpose and value50. On a broader level, history is able to construct 
a sense of national or communal identity if it is collectively shared51. Liu and Hilton quite succinctly 
sum up the idea when stating that “a group’s representation of history will condition its sense of 
what it was, is, can and should be, and is thus central to the construction of its identity, norms, and 
values”52. Acknowledging the fact that historical representation constitutes collective identity helps 
us understanding how these representations condition responses to contemporary phenomena. 
There is thus a causal relationship between how history is represented in a certain society, how 
this influences the construction of a collective identity in said place and how this identity finally 
conditions a specific response to external stimuli. By alluding to familiar historical phenomena that 
resemble a certain contemporary situation, the rhetorical use of history creates a type of traditional 
legitimacy for it53. In other words, a new or uncommon situation becomes more “normal” or 
acceptable when it is historically rooted. As Lowenthal emphasized, what has been there before is 
65
49 (Snow, 1988, 23/29)
50 (Lowenthal, 1985, 41)
51 Ibid. 44.
52 (Liu and Hilton, 2005, 537)
53 (Lowenthal, 1985, 41)
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generally perceived to be more legitimate than recent phenomena54. In order to render a society’s 
social and political arrangements the grade of legitimacy needed, they can be linked to a common 
historical precedent, a kind of heritage that has seemingly developed linearly into the contemporary 
phenomenon. According to Liu and Hilton, “it is through providing such charters that are informally 
accepted by public opinion as true that social representations of history legitimize a society’s current 
social and political arrangements”55. The authors understand “charters” as an account of a group’s 
origin and historical mission. Therefore, they reinforce the idea that correctly representing history 
is a crucial tool to foster legitimacy for sociopolitical phenomena.
What most people are not aware of though is that in order for the past to be able to play this 
contemporary role of identity-construction or legitimization, people are “continually readjusting 
the past to fit the present”56. In order for a historical precedent to suit the need of the present, 
they are constantly reinterpreted, at times exaggerated. Reinterpretation of historical facts may 
be done to rend contemporary situations more comprehensible, to justify present attitudes and 
actions or to underscore changes of faith57. The problem is that at times the historical precedent 
itself may not be glorious enough to succeed in its new task as justificatory evidence. If this is 
the case, Lowenthal argues, we might just “‘improve’ it —exaggerating aspects we find successful, 
virtuous, or beautiful, celebrating what we take pride in, playing down the ignoble, the ugly, the 
shameful”58. What Lowenthal is trying to say is that we intend to present the past in a way that 
accentuates those values or characteristics that we consider positive or honorable nowadays. 
The same pattern is also recognizable in those historical accounts that intend to foster national or 
collective identity, since many reconstructed histories are actually narrowly chauvinist inasmuch 
as they exclude alien achievements for the purpose of highlighting those of the proper nation or 
ethnicity59. This anachronistic and biased way of reinterpreting and highlighting particular features 
of the past in order to make them harmonize with contemporary expectations, can be done either 
on purpose or unconsciously. It is important to recognize that exaggeration and embellishment of 
historical precedents is a commonly committed flaw underlying much of contemporary sociopolitical 
representation of history that aims to satisfy contemporary sociopolitical needs.
One way in which historical events can be instrumentally used to put forward contemporary political 
agendas is through analogical reasoning. Since our topic is related to the analogical use of a specific 
historical precedent in contemporary Chinese foreign policy discourse, our focus lies on analogical 
reasoning in foreign relations rather than for domestic purposes. Put succinctly, analogical reasoning 
in international politics can be understood as the action of using historical analogies to make sense 
of recent phenomena. Historical analogies are thus comparisons between a past event and a new 
phenomenon, if they share common structural similarities60. As has been adequately summed up 
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by Meiernheinrich, this method of reasoning can be used in two major ways: by means of reason 
or rhetoric. On the one hand, if a certain international actor draws on a historical precedent in a 
comparative way for the purpose of facilitating or informing the foreign policy decision making 
process, this can be categorized as analogical reasoning based on reason itself. On the other hand, 
if a historical precedent is rhetorically used to justify or explain a certain foreign policy, previously 
decided upon, this becomes known as analogical reasoning based on rhetoric61. Since in the latter 
case the foreign policy goals are already set, using historical analogies to support one’s view primarily 
acquires a practical quality. As Mumford succinctly put it in his article on “Parallels, prescience and 
the past”, analogical reasoning, when rhetorically used to justify or explain certain recent foreign 
policy phenomena, “becomes self-serving, rests upon a particularly lazy interaction with the past, 
and, because of the political function it is now increasingly being used for, forces history into a 
deliberately persuasive role”62. As we have seen before, historical precedents hold the capacity 
of legitimizing certain contemporary behavior. From this perspective, analogical reasoning in the 
rhetorical realm becomes a practical tool towards generating legitimacy for contemporary events.
Historical reductionism is what inevitably results from such a practical approach of using history for 
present political needs. If analogies are used to rhetorically undermine a political purpose, they are 
reduced to mirroring ideas or ideal outcomes that have been constructed previously. The analogy 
gets constructed into evidence a posteriori, it is not the evidence that helps creating the purpose. 
Mumford agrees with this way of thinking as he argues that rhetorically used analogies may “simply 
reflect back the base fears/hopes of an ideological position”63. Furthermore, he claims that this is 
the reason why 
this schema [of rhetorically using analogical reasoning] nullifies the potential cognitive advantages 
analogies residually possess because those analytical benefits require a greater objectivity of 
purpose (in other words, being open to analogies that may dissuade you from a favoured course of 
action) than the constricting subjectivity of an entrenched ideological position.64
As we can see from Mumford’s theoretical discussion, when reinterpreted historical events are used 
to put forward a certain contemporary political or ideological agenda, then this analogy itself loses 
historical validity. It shifts to a place of mere instrumental utility where “history is shoe-horned 
into analysis in an inductive manner that reinforces already held views of thinking”65. The political 
successes that can be made based on historical analogies thus have to be built upon historical 
reductionism. Making use of analogical reasoning is considerably augmenting the possibility of 
falsified historical representation. As we have seen above, in order for an analogy to be valid, there 
have to be structural similarities between the historical situation and the contemporary one. Since 
historical events are never entirely comparable with contemporary ones, making historical analogies 
to create sense for a recent phenomenon requires a significant amount of historical determinism 
in the first place. If a novel political situation is meant to be justified through analogical reasoning, 
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we are left with only two alternatives: drawing only partial analogies that may only justify certain 
aspects of the situation; or “seek, by various mechanisms, to enhance the degree of overlap 
between the present dilemma and a favoured analogy”66. In other words, if the historical event that 
is meant to legitimize novel policies doesn’t quite fit, its representation may just be modified so as 
to do so. Since analogical reasoning is rhetorically used by governments to justify certain policies, 
we are most likely to find its appearance in official rhetoric. Public statements are the place where 
governments justify and/or explain the implementation of new policies to the broader public. In this 
regard, Strauss claims that official rhetoric serves as a kind of framework through which “policy and 
initiatives are developed, explained and legitimated both domestically and internationally”67. Since 
our point of interest is foreign policy discourse produced in occasions of international fora or in a 
diplomatic context, we are going to focus mainly on discourses that are directed to justifying polices 
to a foreign public. In this regard, official rhetoric in international politics can be seen as a space of 
political persuasion where historical narrative, the targeted audience and contemporary concerns 
converge68. Foreign policy discourse is where politics and historical analogies encounter themselves 
to create a seemingly genealogical narrative, creating linear linkages between (imagined) historical 
events and contemporary politics. Since historical narrative in official rhetoric is transformed into 
supporting evidence, it is the place where we most probably find incongruity between historical fact 
and discursive representation. 
3.2. Zheng He in Sino-African relations discourse
The scarce interest towards Zheng He’s travels in Ming historiography lies in stark contrast with 
recent emphasis in Chinese political discourse. The official narrative on Zheng He in Sino-African 
relations’ discourse has become a frequently used analogy to historically justify and explain China’s 
recent engagement in Africa. As Philip Snow used to put it, “it is no accident that today, when China 
is once more opening up to the world after a phase of withdrawal, that the Chinese Columbus is 
remembered as a hero”69. Mentions of Zheng He are thus systematically added to public documents 
and diplomatic speeches about China’s foreign policy. While looking at some representative examples 
of this discourse, we will argue that Zheng He’s travels have been decontextualized from their 
historical meaning for the purpose of fulfilling present foreign policy needs. These needs include 
fostering an exclusive identity of a peaceful China in contrast to an aggressive West; legitimizing 
Chinese involvement through historical rooting; and reassuring African audiences of China’s well-
intentioned engagement. However, analogical reasoning is not suitable in this case since the Zheng 
He precedent lacks the structural similarities with contemporary Sino-African relations. The Zheng 
He analogy is therefore used in an instrumental, anachronistic and de-historicized way in order to 
achieve the goals mentioned above. Based on our historical discussion about Zheng He’s expeditions, 
we can confirm this perspective, arguing that the foreign policy discourse on Zheng He’s travels 
is considerably exaggerating their historical value and meaning in order to satisfy contemporary 
political goals.
68
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Social representations on Zheng He have increased drastically in both domestic as well as international 
contexts since the turn of this century. Domestically, Zheng He’s travels have been represented in 
various forms such as by celebrating the 600th anniversary in 200570, by publishing a TV series, 
opening museums and celebrating diverse cultural events to commemorate his achievements71. But 
apart from this public policy directed towards domestic Chinese audiences, the Zheng He narrative 
has also been included in political discourses in international fora or in occasions of diplomatic 
meetings. The Ming dynasty expeditions have not just become a frequent anecdote in diplomatic 
discourse; they literally foreground most general official discourse on China-Africa relations72. 
One arguably representative instance to show the importance of this historical analogy is given 
by the Chinese White Paper on “China’s Peaceful Development”. The text goes as follows: “The 
famous Ming Dynasty navigator Zheng He made seven voyages to the Western Seas, visiting over 
30 countries and regions across Asia and Africa. He took along with him the cream of the Chinese 
culture and technology as well as a message of peace and friendship”73. In the latest 2011 version 
of this document, Zheng He is directly used as a historical analogy to represent China’s peaceful 
character, since it is included in the part on “China’s Path of Peaceful Development Is a Choice 
Necessitated by History”. The white paper, as an official document published by the Information 
Office of the State Council, is a government mouthpiece that intends to make clear China’s intentions 
and practices to an international audience. The document is commonly criticized for presenting a 
very one-sided and idealistic vision of the international situation, presenting China as a benevolent 
international player that presumably holds up the ideals of non-intervention, anti-hegemonic and 
peaceful cooperation74. It is not surprising that the authors of this document decided to make use 
of Zheng He’s precedent as an analogy to demonstrate these characteristics.
In other occasions, both, former Party Secretary Hu Jintao as well as the actual Chinese leader 
Xi Jinping have made reference to Zheng He in speeches directed to an international public. On 
occasion of his visit to South Africa in 2007, Hu Jintao publicly stated at Pretoria University that,
The Chinese nation has a long peace-loving tradition; China upholds the principle of not bullying 
the weak and poor, and advancing the harmonization of all nations. Already 600 years ago, the 
famous Chinese navigator Zheng He lead a group of sailors to reach the African East coast four 
times. As opposed to gun diplomacy, pillage and slavery, what the Chinese brought to the Africans 
was the wish for peace and real friendship.75
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70 “Zheng He Anniversary Highlights Peaceful Growth” in China Daily, July 12, 2005 [consulted December 2017].
71 For a detailed account on the increase of Zheng He’s public celebration see (Li, 2005, 15).
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[consulted December 2017].
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家郑和率领庞大船队４次到达非洲东海岸。他们给非洲人民带来的是和平的愿望和真诚的友谊、而不是刀剑
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As can easily be seen in this extract, Hu Jintao makes use of Zheng He’s analogy to send a signal 
of peace and cooperation. The whole speech were this extract is taken from is a hymn of praise 
to China’s friendly and increasing relations with Africa. He also directly draws a contrast between 
the Chinese approach, as represented by Zheng He, and the Western approach, as represented in 
colonialism. The paragraph that includes Zheng He is arguing that China is not, and will never be a 
colonizer. Further down in the same paragraph, Hu manifests that “China has never, is not, and will 
definitely never impose her will and unequal practices on other countries. Even less so will China 
do anything that might harm African people”76. Looking at his statement from this perspective, we 
can see that the Zheng He analogy has been used to contest certain worries that are broadly held 
among African audiences. In a very similar fashion, Xi Jinping included the following in a discourse 
presented at the “Chinese People’s Association for Friendship with Foreign Countries” in 2014,
600 years ago, China’s Zheng He lead by then the strongest fleet to travel seven times into the 
Pacific Ocean and the Western Indian Ocean, visiting more than 30 countries and regions. He hasn’t 
occupied an inch of territory, but he spread the seeds for peaceful friendship. What he left behind 
was a friendly relationship with the coastal people and much-told positive tales abound Chinese 
civilization.77
Xi Jinping’s discourse presents exactly the same message as either Hu Jintao’s speech or the White 
Paper: they all evoke Zheng He as a historical analogy to China’s peaceful and cooperative foreign 
policy approach. In a similar fashion as Hu Jintao’s speech, Xi Jinping’s mentioning of Zheng He 
comes as a justificatory response to those opinions that uphold the so-called “China threat” theory. 
The section of his discourse that incorporates Zheng He begins by saying that “on the international 
stage, there are some people who are worried about China becoming a hegemon, some people 
mentioned the so called ‘China threat theory’”78. He then goes on mentioning three historical 
analogies to refute this point of view: the Silk Road, Zheng He’s travels and twentieth century national 
humiliation. While using these historical precedents to demonstrate China’s peaceful character, he 
also implicitly describes what China is not: “expanding aggressively toward foreign countries [...], 
and penetrating into new areas in the fashion of colonialism”79. This mention is therefore indirectly 
alluding to the idea that historical analogies such as Zheng He’s travels represent China’s peaceful 
character as opposed to Western aggressiveness.
There are numerous other examples that depict Zheng He in a similar light, either in more 
comprehensive fora on international relations or on specific diplomatic occasions in Sino-African 
relations80. However, it suffices to mention the examples of Hu, Xi and the White Paper in order 
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有损于非洲国家和人民的事。 Ibid.
77 600多年前、中国的郑和率领当时世界上最强大的船队7次远航太平洋和西印度洋、到访了30多个国家和
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80 Two other examples to demonstrate the local implementation of this discourse would be two speeches given by 
Liu Guijin, 刘贵今, the Chinese ambassador to South Africa, and the now ambassador of Cape Verde Du Xiaocong, 
杜小丛. The first speech was given at the “African Business Leaders Forum” in Johannesburg in 2007, whereas the 
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to demonstrate the general pattern of including the Zheng He analogy in political discourses. All 
the three examples are produced on the highest possible level of Chinese politics, either by the 
Party Secretary himself or by a representative institution of the government. Therefore, we can 
confidently affirm that using Zheng He as a historical analogy in Chinese foreign policy discourse, 
especially in Sino-African relations discourse, is quite common. The need to make use of Zheng 
He in official rhetoric as analogical reasoning for peace and friendship has to be understood in the 
light of recent criticism on Chinese involvement in Africa by both Western as well as African voices. 
Those who decry China’s supposedly ill-intentioned interests in Africa are being more and more 
numerous81. These critiques range from calling China a “neo-colonialist” player that benefits from a 
raw-material exploitation, to accusing her for playing a game of unfair competitiveness in Africa, not 
caring about labour rights, and having a bad impact on the environment etc.82 Confronted with this 
situation, Zheng He’s historical analogy has been included in public speeches as a tool for refuting 
these arguments83. It is in this fashion that “allusions to epochs that long pre-date CCP’s rise to 
power serve a different function in that they deliberately speak to African concerns as to the long 
term impact of China’s deepening involvement in Africa”84. Consequently, we have to understand 
the use of Zheng He as a rhetoric analogical reasoning, such as previously discusses by Meierhenrich. 
It is purposefully included in official rhetoric in order to support arguments previously held, it serves 
as a historical evidence for a broader geopolitical purpose. In this regard, the analogical use of 
Zheng He’s travels can be summed up in three mutually interrelated main categories: it creates an 
essentialist Chinese identity to project the image of a benevolent China, it creates legitimacy for 
China’s recent engagement in Africa through historical rooting; and it reassures African audiences 
about China’s positive intentions. 
By creating a binary distinction between West and China, on an aggression versus peace axis, 
the Zheng He analogy is reinforcing the idea of how history can manifest group identity through 
discursive representation. In accordance with what Liu and Hilton argue, identity-construction 
through historical representation is eventually essentializing each group’s characteristic traits85. In 
the Zheng He analogy, these identity traits can be identified as “’benevolent’, ’peaceful’, ‘respectful’, 
and ‘generous’, juxtaposed to the Western other constructed by differentiated signs such as 
‘imperialistic’, ‘aggressive’, ‘oppressive’, and ‘greedy’”86. Faced with numerous accusations about 
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China’s neo-colonialist intentions, Chinese government officials draw a historical parallel with this 
historic identity and Chinese recent involvement in Africa. Speeches on Sino-African relations that 
include Zheng He generally include some variation of this purposeful distinction between a supposed 
Western colonialist character and a Chinese essence of equality. As we can see, this is a rhetoric way 
of using analogical reasoning that aims to manifest an essentialized binary identity for the purpose 
of contesting contemporary accusations. Since this benevolent Chinese identity is constructed in 
a simplified and easily digestible way, it favors the contemporary Chinese agenda of projecting a 
benevolent image to African audiences87. The Zheng He analogy comprises the capacity to legitimize 
Chinese involvement in Africa through historical rooting. As a direct result of the aforementioned 
binary identity construction, China is represented as a more legitimate player than the West. As 
Sverdrup-Thygenson correctly pointed out in a recent article, “through presenting China in this 
positive light, a direct comparison with the West is drawn, where China is legitimized and the West 
delegitimized”88. We saw earlier that rooting a contemporary event in history provides this novel 
situation with a kind of traditional or historical legitimacy. By representing Sino-African relations 
as something that already had its peak 600 years ago, Chinese official rhetoric renders the whole 
situation less “novel”, and thereby less controversial. 
Finally, making use of the Zheng He analogy is reassuring African audiences on the positive outcome 
that their reinforced cooperation may have. The logic of the discourse goes somewhat like this: 
assuming that China has never engaged in any conflict with African countries during Zheng He’s 
time, and claiming that China engaged in peaceful and mutually beneficial trade, today Africans 
should not be preoccupied by the kind of fears expressed in “China threat” representations or 
the like. This parallel is further substantiated when stressing that China was the biggest maritime 
power during the time Zheng He’s travels were held, relating this to China’s current power status. 
Therefore, history, as represented by the Zheng He analogy, comes to play a role of assuring African 
leaders that despite China being an emerging superpower nowadays, she will act in accordance 
with her historical legacy89. Relating this idea with China’s supposedly benevolent identity, this 
means that the Zheng He analogy is meant to reassure African audiences that “commercial ties will 
not result in exploitation or even some form of colonialism on the part of China”90. In other words, 
Africans should be able to undue their concerns as they recognize that China has been intermingling 
with Africa before without creating any problems. The problem with this narrative is that, form a 
historical perspective, making use of Zheng He for analogical reasoning that is supposed to justify 
Chinese recent engagement in Africa is not very suitable. The structural similarities between a 
historical event that happened more than 600 years ago and contemporary Sino-African relations 
are too big to oversee, therefore they considerably weaken the validity of the points intended to 
be made. As has been rightly pointed out by Li Xinfeng, there are a range of structural differences 
between the historical context of Zheng He’s travels and today’s China-Africa relations. For instance, 
contemporary China-Africa relations have surmounted considerably those of Zheng He’s times; now 
they have a strategic outline; they are based on mutual agency instead of being merely instigated 
by China; they produce themselves in a much more integrated globalized world order etc.91 In fact, 
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official Chinese rhetoric is trying to compare two sociopolitical phenomena that have produced 
themselves in completely different historical contexts, have different purposes, a considerably 
different grade of impact and last but not least more than 6 centuries separating them form each 
other. Even if one was to consider the contextual frame to be comparable, one must stick to a 
radically essentialist understanding of identity in order to accept the premise that it has been static 
throughout all this time. Therefore, it seems logical that in order for this analogy to work out, those 
who produce the discourse have to turn a blind eye on various historical facts. 
The Zheng He analogy is a good example of how people introduce contemporary ideals and values 
into past events in order to make them fit better into the contemporary agenda. As we have seen, 
the Zheng He discourse has to be understood as a response to the type of “China threat” criticism 
mentioned above. In order for the Zheng He analogy to be able to refute contemporary accusations, 
it has to be filled with those values that sustain the argument. In this regard, China’s peaceful rise, 
win-win cooperation, non-interference and anti-colonial struggle are all concepts that become 
useful assets to rhetorically justify China’s involvement in Africa92. As we have seen in the extracts 
above, the general tendency in policy discourse is to relate Zheng He with these mentioned values 
and concepts. However, critically speaking these values have not been part of Zheng He’s missions. 
Firstly, it is true that Ming China was the most powerful country in the world during the time of Zheng 
He’s travels; however the geopolitical aspirations were arguably very different historically and today. 
With exception of Yongle’s rule, the Ming court was principally introvert without a lot of interest in 
“going out”. Zheng He’s travels were ephemeral and tightly related to the personal aspirations of 
Yongle, they should thus not be interpreted as an integral part of some imagined process of Ming 
dynasty’s “rise”. Secondly, the same is true for win-win cooperation or mutual benefit, as equally 
claimed by the Zheng He discourse. Even if trade can be seen as a minor motivating factor for the 
expeditions, it was mostly conducted under the banner of the tributary system, a kind of exchange 
a la houwang-bolai. The latter refers to a kind of trade where you usually receive less than you give. 
The ideological values of these two kinds of trade are different93. Finally, non-interference has also 
been belatedly projected into Zheng He’s voyages. The fact that the expeditions’ agenda was to 
introduce African states into their tributary system and make this happen forcefully if needed refutes 
this idealized perspective. In sum, all these values that are a posteriori projected into Zheng He’s 
travels are a complete contemporary construction. Instead of actually representing historical facts, 
the discourse tries to decorate the Zheng He precedent with those values that Chinese politicians 
consider important today. 
The problem of making analogical use of Zheng He’s travels is that, in order for it to function, 
it is considerably exaggerating or even falsifying historical facts. The proper construction of the 
“benevolent” and “peaceful” China in the Zheng He analogy is created upon the premise that 
Zheng He’s travels have been a peaceful exploration. But as we have seen before, from a historical 
perspective this cant’ be stated this way without any problems. As Dreyer accentuates, Chinese 
official discourse is considerably overstating the peaceful nature of Zheng He’s travels94. All the 
three main sets of ideas that the Zheng He discourse intends to project, a benevolent Chinese 
identity, the legitimacy of Chinese involvement in Africa and reassurance to African audiences all 
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depend on a historical imagination of Zheng He as a peaceful and friendly visitor. If this premise is 
questioned, the discourse could not sustain itself any longer and the very instrumentality of the 
Zheng He analogy would become nullified. Therefore, the case of the Zheng He analogy shows 
pretty clear how a rhetorical use of analogical reasoning is dehistoricizing past events for the sake 
of justifying recent phenomena.
Conclusion
Throughout Sino-African relations’ discourse, Zheng He’s travels have become tools to better fit 
contemporary political needs. This is done by considerably distorting, exaggerating and decorating 
this great historical event. In order to argue the said, this article has been separated into two main 
parts: the historical discussion on the peaceful character of Zheng He’s travels; and an analysis of 
the Zheng He analogy in contemporary Sino-African relations discourse. 
First, instead of interpreting Zheng He’s expeditions as either peaceful voyages or proto-colonialism, 
they should be understood in what Dreyer calles “Ming power projection” through the expansion of 
the tributary system. Through a historical contextualization of the voyages and an analysis of Ming 
diplomacy, we found out that Zheng He’s expeditions are actually more an expression of Yongle’s 
personal aspirations instead of a representation of Ming dynasty foreign relations. So even if there 
are historical records that describe Ming foreign relations to be thoroughly peaceful in nature, 
we considered that the historical discussion on Zheng He’s travels have to reintroduce Yongle’s 
personal ambitions, which were considerably more expansionist. By drawing on the Zheng He entry 
of the Mingshi, we found out that the purposes of these travels were already succinctly summed 
up, namely to manifest the power of Ming dynasty throughout foreign countries, however using 
force to pacify those who didn’t submit. In this regard, we argued that to claim these expeditions to 
be “friendship voyages” or “peaceful explorations” is not accurate, since this peace is achieved by 
threatening the use of force. The fact that we don’t have evidences to prove the explicit use of force 
doesn’t allow us to make overhasty judgments. 
Second, even if the argument of Zheng He’s expeditions being a peaceful endeavor cannot be 
supported by historical evidences, they are rhetorically molded to be represented as such, for the 
purpose of serving as a historical analogy to refute contemporary accusations about China’s ill-
intentioned involvement in Africa. In order to support this claim, we took the theoretical discussion 
on history’s instrumental use in analogical reasoning as our starting point. Since history benefits 
the present by providing group identity and legitimizing novel sociopolitical phenomena, it is often 
rhetorically used to do so. However, as can be seen through the case of the Zheng He analogy in 
Sino-African relations discourse, historical analogies have to be frequently remolded in order to 
serve contemporary needs. By citing three examples of the recent rhetorical use of the Zheng He 
analogy in high level diplomatic representations, we found out that Zheng He is used to foster an 
image of a benevolent China, to legitimize China’s involvement in Africa and to reassure African 
audiences about China’s intentions. We argued that these goals have to be understood as a reaction 
to international criticism. However, in order for these objectives to be achieved, the discourse ignores 
that the contextual differences between Ming dynasty and contemporary China are simply too big 
to draw simplified comparisons. Additionally, it projects contemporary values into the Zheng He 
voyages, and it considerably exaggerates or even distorts the premise on Zheng He being a peaceful 
endeavor. Due to these reasons, we claimed that the Zheng He discourse has been dehistoricized 
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in contemporary Sino-African relations discourse to serve contemporary needs of justifying China’s 
recent engagement in Africa.
The politicized narrative surrounding Zheng He’s travels and their relationship with contemporary 
needs makes us recognize the broader connectivity between power and historical reproduction. 
Sverdrup-Thygeson is right when stating that:
An event may support many equally valid narratives, some of them gaining prominence, due to 
being nurtured by groups with the power to establish this version of the truth as dominant, and 
the will to do so, because of inherent qualities with that narrative suiting it to serve those groups’ 
interests.95
His statement reaffirms the fact that historical representations are never objective. In order to 
reduce the biased nature of dominant narratives, we have to ask ourselves who produces certain 
types of discourses and with what intention in mind. The vulnerability to use the Zheng He narrative 
for different purposes is arguably reinforced by the scarce historical references we have. However, 
we have seen that even if there are certain evidences that counter a certain way of representation, 
this doesn’t mean representations cant’ be molded according to the producers taste. Therefore, 
recognizing this instrumental adaptability of historical events should contribute to create awareness 
among those of us who consume historical discourses to reconsider their level of veracity.
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